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or not a court of equity will strictly enforce the condition precedent when
time has been made of the essence of a bilateral contract. Though it
seems that most of the other cases in Ohio have adopted a strict construc-
tion, and required performance of conditions precedent, there is abundant
authority favoring the lenient construction adopted by the majority.
It was, however, the view of the dissent that this was not a case of
a bilateral contract, but of an option, and for that reason the condition
precedent of performance on time should be strictly enforced. This
seems to be a perfectly justifiable view if we can consider that this was
an option, since equity will not give relief where there is a failure to
comply with the conditions of an option because there is no forfeiture,
but the option holder is left in status quo. Lauderdale Power Co. v.
Perry, 202 Ala. 394, 80 So. 476 (1918); Hughes v. Holliday, 149
Ga. 147, 99 S.E. 301 (1919); I Ames, Cases on Equity Jurisdiction,
p. 32on (1904). "The burden of proof in an action for specific per-
formance of an option is on the plaintiff to show either a tender of the
purchase price or a justification for his failure to do so. But a mistaken
belief that title was encumbered will not excuse the plaintiff's failure to
tender the purchase price within time." Bingham v. Shoup, supra. The
general view is, then, that in the case of an option time will be of the
essence, and will be regarded as a condition precedent which will be
strictly enforced. There is, however, one line of authority which holds
that a condition precedent will not be strictly enforced even in an option.
F. B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, 97 Conn. 619, II8 At. 47, 27 A.L.R.
976 (1922). If this view were followed, the decision of the majority
could be upheld even if this be considered an option, though to go to this
extent would seem to be a glaring example of coddling a debtor.
JOHN S. MITCHELL
EVIDENCE
PRESUMPTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE RAISED BY
PLAINTIFF'S OWN EVIDENCE
Plaintiff's evidence disclosed that his automobile was struck by
defendant's backing engine on an improved grade crossing. The cross-
ing was well known to plaintiff, and the visibility was obscured by the
early morning fog. The trial court charged on negligence, and requested
counsel for any additionally desired instructions. None were offered, but
defendant's counsel made a general exception. The court of appeals
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the sole ground that the trial
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court committed prejudicial error in failing to charge the jury upon the
principle that if plaintiff's evidence raises a presumption of contributory
negligence, then before plaintiff could recover, this presumption must
be dispelled by evidence of at least equal weight. The Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the trial court on the
ground that had a charge been requested on this phase, it would have
been the duty of the court to have done so, but since it was not requested,
the error, if any, was one of omission, and not commission, and not
prejudicial. Valencic v. Akron & B.B.R. Co., 133 Ohio St. 287, 13
N.E. (2d) 240 (1938).
The Supreme Court by dictum in this case threw an interesting new
light on the confusion and indecision of the cases dealing with this pre-
sumption of contributory negligence by declaring that, "it is not a pre-
sumption of law but a presumption of fact, or, as is often called, an
inference." It again raises the question: What is this "presumption";
why and what is its effect?
The doctrine first appeared in Ohio in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.
v. Whitacre, 35 Ohio St. 627 (I88o), where the court said, "If plain-
tiff's testimony raises a presumption of contributory negligence, then it
is his duty to remove that presumption, otherwise he would fail in his
action." As a basis for this statement the court cited Hays v. Gallager,
72 Pa. at I41 (1872), and Robison & Weaver v. Gary, 28 Ohio St.
241 (x876). The former case stated, "If plaintiff's own evidence dis-
closes facts which prove negligence, it is not necessary that the defendant
should prove it." The latter case declared that, in such a case, the pre-
sumption of due care on plaintiff's part is so far removed that he cannot
be relieved from disproving his own negligence, and that the question
should be left, upon the whole evidence, to the determination of the
jury, with the instruction that the plaintiff can not recover if his own
negligence contributed to the injury. But neither case spoke of any
presumption which plaintiff must remove.
Formerly the presumption of contributory negligence was declared
to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff. P. & L.E. Ry. Co. v. Blair,
ii Ohio C.C. 579. But later it was decided that if plaintiff's own
testimony raises a presumption of contributory negligence upon his part,
the burden of proof does not shift, and he is only required to furnish
such proof as is sufficient merely to equal or counterbalance the evidence
tending to show contributory negligence on his part. Tresise v. Ash-
down, 118 Ohio St. 307, 316, 16o N.E. 898, 58 A.L.R. 1476
(1928).
It has been said that there is no burden upon plaintiff to remove a
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mere suggestion of contributory negligence created by his own evidence;
there must be an inference from facts. Lopa v. Smith, 37 Ohio App.
346, 174 N.E. 258. Aff'd in 123 Ohio St. 213, 174 N.E. 735. The
courts constantly speak of presumption or inference in the alternative and
the last cited case declares that the two terms are used interchangeably.
Each party is entitled to the benefit of evidence in his favor no matter
which party offers it and thus plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of any
evidence that may be produced by the defense tending to dispel the
inference or presumption of negligence that has arisen from plaintiff's
own evidence. Smith v. Lopa, supra. If plaintiff's evidence is suscept-
ible of no other reasonable inference than that of negligence on his part
directly contributing to the injury, and plaintiff is not aided by other
evidence in the case, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict
for the defendant. Buell, Adm'x v. N.Y.C.R. Co. 114 Ohio St. 40,
i5o N.E. 422 (1926); 29 Ohio Jur., "Negligence," 655; C.C.C. &
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lee, i ii Ohio St. 391, 145 N.E. 843 (1925).
The rule has led our trial courts to charge the jury in this manner:
"If you find that the evidence offered by the plaintiff raises a reasonable
presumption of negligence on his part * * * , the burden is cast upon
plaintiff to rebut or counterbalance the presumption, or he can not
recover." Now, if plaintiff's evidence has made a prima facie case of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, defendant's motion for a
directed verdict will be granted. If not so strong, then the case goes
to the jury, and the burden is upon plaintiff to rebut the presumption.
But it is not, in truth, a presumption that the jury is requested to find,
but an inference. What the jury is really told is that if it finds any
evidence (more than a mere suspicion) of contributory negligence in
plaintiff's own evidence, then from the entire evidence of plaintiff and
defendant it must find enough evidence to counterbalance this evidence
or "presumption" before it can go ahead and determine the issue of
contributory negligence in the whole case with the burden of proof on
the defendant. Thus, upon the appearance of evidence of contributory
negligence in plaintiff's case, the burden of going forward and dispelling
this evidence is placed upon him. It is exceedingly difficult for a jury
to apply such an instruction.
The most common statement used by the courts supposedly follow-
ing the same view as that of Ohio is: "Where plaintiff's own case pre-
sents evidence which, unexplained, makes out prima facie contributory
negligence on his part, he must produce further evidence exculpating
him, or he cannot recover." Grant v. Chicago, Etc. Ry. Co., 78 Mont.
97, 252 Pac. 382 (1927). It is to be noted, however, that this rule
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seems to be applied only in cases terminating in a directed verdict, non-
suit, or sustained demurrer.
There seems to be no logical reason to require the creation of the
presumption or the shifting of the burden of going forward to the
plaintiff. There is a presumption against the negligence of either party.
Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, and the burden of
proving it by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant.
Knisely v. Community Traction Go., 125 Ohio St. 131, 136, I8o N.E.
654; Maddex v. Columbus, 114 Ohio St. 178, I86, 151 N.E. 613.
Plaintiff does not have to plead nor prove freedom from contributory
negligence. If plaintiff's evidence established a prima facie case of con-
tributory negligence, then he has made a defense to his own case-he
has failed to make out his prima facie case, and the court will direct a
verdict for defendant. If there is no contributory negligence as a matter
of law, then the case should go to the jury with the burden of proving
contributory negligence entirely on defendant, the defendant having any
benefit that he may secure from either his own or plaintiff's evidence.
This seems to have been the doctrine of the cases which an early Ohio
court interpreted as creating a presumption against the plaintiff.
This view is in accord with the holdings of a majority of courts.
"Where the plaintiff's evidence makes a prima facie case of negligence
proximately causing the injury and merely raises a question of contribu-
tory negligence to be solved by the jury, the burden of proving such
defense is on the defendant." Fort Worth Gas Co. v. Cooper, 241
S.W. 282 (1922); Houston B. & T. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 19 S.W. (2d)
77 (1929). The burden of establishing contributory negligence is on
the defendant, though proof of such negligence may arise out of the
plaintiff's testimony in the first instance. Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co.
v. Buchanan, 2 Boyce 202 (Del), 78 Atl. 776 (1911). The fact that
the burden is on defendant to establish contributory negligence does not
preclude defendant from taking advantage of plaintiff's own evidence
showing him guilty of contributory negligence. Houdashelt v. State
Highway, 137 Kan. 485, 21 Pac. (2d) 343 (933); Washington,
4. & Mt. V. Ry. v. Vaughn, III Va. 785, 69 S.E. 1035 (191).
The burden does not shift, but defendant must go ahead and prove
contributory negligence with the aid of plaintiff's adduced evidence.
Rapp v. Sarpy County, 71 Neb. 383, 98 N.W. 1042 (1904). Unless
evidence bf plaintiff establishes contributory negligence as a matter of
law, the burden is on defendant to show that fact. The jury must be
instructed in determining such issue that they may look to all the facts
in the case. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Melville, 87 S.W. 863
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(1905); Harrington v. Eureka Hill Min. Co., 17 Utah 300, 53 Pac.
737 (i898)- "The fact that plaintiff, in making out his own case,
introduces evidence tending to prove his own contributory negligence
does not change the nature of the issue, * * * and the fact that the
defendant may use the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not
shift the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff." 2o
R.C.L., Neg. 164, p. 200. When different inferences may be drawn
from the evidence, the burdeii of establishing contributory negligence
is upon the defendant, regardless of whether the evidence with regard
thereto comes from plaintiff's or defendant's witnesses. The burden is
on defendant, although contributory negligence may have been infer-
able from testimony produced by plaintiff. Conway v. S. L. & 0. Ry.
Co., 47 Utah 510, I55 Pac. 339, L.R.A. i 9 i6D, 1io9 (1916);
Dahlquist v. Denver & R.G.R. Co-, 52 Utah 438, 174 Pac. 833
(1918).
Ohio cases have been gradually weakening the "presumption" rule,
and the court of appeals in Tudor Boiler Mfg. Co. v. Teeken, 33 Ohio
App. 512, 519, 169 N.E. 704, (motion to certify overruled Mar. 21,
1929) strove to adopt the better and sounder rule. Therein, it criticized
the necessarily indefinite application of the rule laid down in B. & 0. v.
Vhitacre, supra, and the consequent vacillation of the burden of proving
contributory negligence. Refusing to follow it, the court said: "As we
view the law, supported by the great weight of authority, (if there be no
prima facie case for a directed verdict), the rule is that the burden of
proof is on defendant to show contributory negligence, but that the
defendant is entitled to all of the evidence in the case, that presented by
the plaintiff as well as that presented by the defendant."
The rule as at present accepted by the Ohio courts is not only with-
out logical support, but it is also to be regretted, in that it uselessly con-
fuses the jury by the complexity of its application, and harasses the
already burdened trial court by increasing the danger of reversible error
in its instructions. It is hoped that a simpler and sounder doctrine will
soon be enunciated by the Ohio Supreme Court.
JAmEs M. GORMAN
